

STATE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SE-9

CONCLUSIONS

1. If cease-fire negotiations should break down, we believe that Communist forces in Korea will probably continue large-scale military operations in the area and may undertake offensive actions against UN troops at an early date.
2. Although Chinese Communist over-all capabilities in Korea have been improved since the April-May offensive, we do not believe that under present circumstances they could destroy or drive UN forces from Korea even if they were to employ their current maximum air capability in support of a ground offensive.
3. We believe, therefore, that in the event of a breakdown of cease-fire discussions and resumption of military operations in Korea, the Communists will have to choose between: (a) continuation of a conflict of substantial scale and nature that preceded the cease-fire negotiations; or (b) adoption of measures calculated to destroy or expel UN forces.
4. If UN/US forces are to be defeated the USSR must provide substantial aid in man and materiel. If Soviet personnel were to be employed in sufficient strength to add decisively to Chinese Communist capabilities, such personnel would almost certainly come in direct contact with US forces, creating a state of de facto war. We do not believe the USSR is willing to accept the risk of such a de facto war, which might expand into general war, merely to insure an early defeat or expulsion of UN/US forces.
5. We, therefore, believe that the Kremlin will, on the one hand, attempt to prevent an extension of the area of conflict and, on the other, in recognition of internal strains in Communist China, endeavor to provide enough logistical and technical assistance to insure maintenance of Chinese Communist will and ability to continue military operations in Korea.
6. If, however, the Communist forces in Korea were threatened with decisive defeat, the Kremlin would probably intensify its aid, even to the employment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a de facto UN/US-USSR war would exist.
7. If UN/US forces took the initiative in expanding the area of conflict, the USSR probably would provide whatever aid necessary, short of open war, to counter UN/US measures. If this should be inadequate and Communist control over North China and Manchuria were endangered, the Kremlin probably would intensify its aid even to the point of risking global war.

State Dept. review completed

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5. It is [ ] likely that the Kremlin will, on the one hand, attempt to prevent an extension of the area of conflict, and will, [ ] on the other hand, endeavor to provide enough logistical and technical assistance to insure maintenance of Chinese Communist and North Korean will and ability to continue military operations in Korea. It is estimated, however, that if Soviet military assistance were not employed in sufficient strength to add decisively to Chinese Communist capabilities, Moscow and Pei-p'ing might face a serious task in seeking to continue the war in Korea in view of the internal economic and political strain which the Korean military venture has already brought for the Pei-p'ing regime. If successful in insuring Communist China's will and ability to continue operations, the Kremlin may estimate that thereby it could oblige the UN/US to maintain very substantial forces in Korea indefinitely, at great cost and with continuing strain on the political and military relations of the participating UN nations.

Note: Underlining indicates additions; [ ] indicates omissions.

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